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ADVERSE POSSESSION OF
THE SEVERED MINERAL
ESTATE IN ARKANSAS

Professor Phillip E. Norvell

ADVERSE POSSESSION AND THE SEVERED MINERAL ESTATE IN ARKANSAS
by
Professor Phillip E. Norvell
University o f Arkansas School o f Law (Fayetteville)

“There is something about property law that makes it go crazy when it gets underground. ”
CHARLES C. CALLAHAN, ADVERSE POSSESSION 63 (1961).

I.

Adverse Possession of Mineral Interests by Surface Occupancy
A.

Adverse possession by surface occupancy acquires title to subsurface minerals if
the minerals have not been severed from the fee prior to the claimant’s surface
entry. Stewart v. Pelt. 131 S.W.2d 644 (Ark. 1939).
1.

The rationale for the result.
“Cujus et solu, ergo est usque ad coelum et ad infernos,” is the venerable
Latin phrase that has historically been used to refer to the common law’s
A d coelum theory o f land ownership. The doctrine holds that the owner o f
the fee owns the subsurface o f the land. The phrase is roughly translated as
“To whom ever owns the soil, he owns also to the sky and to the depths.”
See, e. g., Del Monte Mining & Milling Co. v. Last Chance Mining &
Milling Co., 171 U.S. 55 (1898).

2.

The Texas statement o f the rule.
“The general rule is that if there is no severance o f mineral rights from the
surface, an adverse entry upon the surface extends downward and draws to
it a title to the underlying minerals.” Broughton v. Humble Oil and R ef
Co., 105 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Tex. Ct. App. 1937).

B.

Adverse possession by surface occupancy does not obtain title to previously
severed minerals. Bodcaw Lumber. Co. v. Goode. 254 S.W. 345 (Ark. 1923).
1.

The rationale for the result.
“ The statute o f limitations does not run against these rights (severed
mineral interests) unless there is an actual adverse holding which
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constitutes an invasion o f these rights.” Id. at 348.
2.

Understanding the severed versus non-severed mineral distinction.
When only a fractional share o f the mineral ownership has been severed
from the original fee title, the non-severed minerals are acquired by adverse
possession o f the surface estate. See, e.g., Wright v. Buckner. 236 S.W.2d
720 (Ark. 1951).

See also Fadem v.Kimball. 612 P.2d 287, 292 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979),

wherein the Court states: “We think it is clear that a conveyance or
reservation o f a fractional interest in the minerals by the owner o f a fee
simple estate will only effect a severance o f the fractional interest so
conveyed or reserved.”

C.

The severance o f the mineral estate from the fee.
1.

Mineral deeds, reservations in deeds, or devises in wills.
Minerals are severed by an operative conveyance, testamentary disposition,
or judicial decree that separates the ownership o f the surface and the
minerals. 1 Eugene Kuntz, Oil and Gas § 10.4. (W.H. Anderson Co.
1962).

2.

The participation in an off-tract unit well.
Participation in a unit well that was located off-tract, not situated on the
tract in issue, did not cause a severance o f the mineral estate from the fee.
Krosmico v. Pettit. 968 P.2d 345 (Okla. 1998).

3.

The execution o f an oil and gas lease.
a.

The Texas cases.

i.

Courts in Texas hold that the execution o f an oil and gas
lease severs the oil and gas from the fee. Weems v.
Hawkins. 278 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
What is the effect o f adverse possession o f the surface after
the execution o f an oil and gas lease in Texas? “Logically,
adverse possession should run as to rights retained by the
lessor, both under the existing lease, as to royalties for
example, and as to the reversionary interest which would
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divest the lessee o f all title upon expiration o f the lease.
Discussion Notes, 1 O.&G.R. 447 at 450.
b.

The Oklahoma cases.
Courts in Oklahoma hold that the execution o f an oil and gas lease
does not sever the oil and gas from the fee. Krosmico v. Pettit.
968 P.2d 345 (Okla. 1998).

c.

Distinguishing the Texas and Oklahoma cases.
Texas, following the “ownership in place” theory, holds that the
landowner’s interest in subsurface oil and gas is a corporeal
interest. Eliff v. Texon Drilling Co.. 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948).
Oklahoma, following the “exclusive right to take theory,” known as
the “nonownership” theory, holds that the landowner’s interest in
subsurface oil and gas is an incorporeal interest. Rich v .
Doneehev. 177 P. 86 (Okla. 1918). Is this an illusory distinction?
Arkansas is typically cited as following the corporeal interest
theory as to the landowner’s interest in oil and gas. See, e.g.,
Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode. 254 S.W. 345 (Ark. 1923).
However, Arkansas follows the incorporeal interest theory, the
exclusive right to take theory, as to the lessee’s interest in the oil
and gas lease. Mansfield Gas Co. v. Alexander. 133 S.W. 839
(Ark. 1911).

4.

The doctrine o f merger.
a.

The definition o f merger.
“The term merger means that, where a lesser and a greater estate in
the same land come together and vest, without any intermediate
estate, in the same person and in the same right, the lesser is
immediately annihilated by operation o f law. It is said to be
“merged, i.e., sunk or drowned, in the greater estate”. G.C.
Cheshire, The M odem Law o f Real Property 831 (Butterworths
10th ed. 1967).

See also Bingham v. Rhea. 143 S.W.2d 1087, 1088 (1940).
b.

The merger issue arises when the ownership o f the severed
mineral estate and the surface estate are subsequently reunited. If
the merger doctrine is applied, the severed mineral estate is merged
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with the fee and, thereafter, for adverse possession purposes, is
treated as a non-severed mineral interest.
I find no case in point from any jurisdiction but two cases are
worthy o f note.
i.

Merger is a matter o f intent.
The merger o f a previously severed mineral interest with a
subsquently acquired surface estate is a matter o f intent.
Ferguson v. Hilborn, 402 P.2d 914 (Okla. 1965).

ii.

Merger occurs as a matter o f law.
Jones v. McFaddin. 382 S.W. 2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964)
held that the sovereign’s title to mines and minerals, derived
from the Civil Law o f Spain that prevailed in Texas prior to
1835, was merged into the private landowner’s fee title by
the Constitutional Release o f 1866 in which the State o f
Texas, by a constitutional provision, relinquished its mineral
title to landowners. The argument that fee simple absolute
estates, being estates o f equal dignity, were not merged at
the common law was rejected in the case. McFaddin dealt
with a surface owner’s acquisition o f the severed mineral
interest by virtue o f a State Constitutional provision and
offers little support to the applicability o f the merger
doctrine to private conveyancing.

D.

The horrors o f the unrecorded mineral severance.
1.

The adverse possessor and the unrecorded mineral reservation.
An unrecorded mineral deed is valid against a subsequent bona fide
purchaser who acquires title by adverse possession that is based on surface
occupancy that began after the execution o f the unrecorded mineral deed.
Taylor v . Scott. 685 S.W.2d 160 (Ark. 1985).
Taylor v. Scott establishes that the severance o f the mineral estate for
purposes o f determining the interests acquired by the adverse possessor
occurs when the mineral deed is executed, not recorded. As a
consequence, any break in the record chain-of-title raises the possibility
that an unrecorded deed containing a mineral reservation may exist which
pre-dates the adverse possession, and will result in mineral ownership
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2.

contrary to that reflected by the record title.
Proving the contents o f a “lost deed.”
The claimant to a mineral reservation in a lost deed must prove its contents
by clear, satisfactory and convincing proof. Witt v. Graves. 787 S.W.2d
681 (Ark. 1990).

II.

Severance of Title to the Minerals after the Surface Entry by the Adverse Possessor
A.

Severance o f the mineral title by the fee owner.
The fee owner’s severance o f title to minerals after the surface entry by the adverse
possessor does not interrupt the running o f the limitation period. The adverse
possessor acquires title to the severed mineral estate. Broughton v. Humble Oil &
R ef Co., 105 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
1.

The rationale for the result.
“It is a general rule that once adverse possession has begun, that it may
only be interrupted by an ouster, actual or constructive. An actual ouster
would consist o f physical remover o f the AP from the premises, and a
constructive ouster by the successful prosecution o f an action in ejectment
to judgment. A conveyance or reservation o f the minerals, or the execution
o f an oil and gas lease, does not constitute an ouster and, hence, will not
interrupt possession.” Ates v. Yellow Pine Land Co., 310 So.2d 772, 775
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).

2.

The Arkansas authority, however slight, to the contrary.
A severed mineral interest survived plaintiffs acquisition o f title to wild
and unimproved land by payment o f taxes for 7 years under color o f title
pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 18-11-102. The mineral severance occurred
after plaintiff commenced paying taxes under color o f title. Jones v.
Brown. 199 S.W.2d 973 (Ark. 1947). Compare Payne v. A M. Fruh C o.,
98 N.W .2d 27 (N.D. 1959).

B.

Severance by adverse possessor.
1.

Before the limitation period has run, the adverse possessor conveys all
minerals to a third party grantee. Adverse possessor remains in possession
o f the surface. After the limitation period has run, the adverse possessor
owns the surface and the third-party grantee owns the minerals. Clements
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v . Texas C o., 273 S.W. 993 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
“But a severance by one in possession, who has not yet matured a title,
does not abandon, limit, or qualify his possession for the purpose o f
ripening a title against the true owner out o f possession; and that, as
against such disseized owner, the continued possession o f a trespasser after
severance, as before, is adverse, and that such possession continued by
either the trespasser or the third person to whom he severs will mature a
limitation to the entire tract as against such disseized owner.” Id. at 10041005.
2.

Before the limitation period has run, the adverse possessor conveys the
land to a third party grantee and reserves all minerals. The third party
grantee goes into surface possession and the periods o f occupation o f the
two aggregate the limitation period. The third-party grantee owns the
surface and the original adverse possessor owns the minerals. Houston Oil
Co. v. M oss. 284 S.W.2d 131, 137.
“As against a third party, possession by either the grantor or grantee where
severance is attempted by a trespasser should be regarded as possession o f
the entire premises for the benefit o f both, since collectively they are
asserting a common title against the third party o f which he has adequate
notice by the possession o f either. The result in this case is also desirable
for policy reasons in that it will protect property owners, since in most
cases it is the rightful owner who must rely upon the statute o f limitations
to protect his title against the assertion o f old claims.” Id. At 137.

Compare Thomas v. Southwestern Settlement & Development
Co., 131 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).

3.

Before the limitation period has run, the adverse possessor conveys onehalf (1/2) o f the minerals to a third party grantee. Adverse possessor

remains in possession o f the surface. After the limitation period has run,
the adverse possessor owns the surface and one-half (1/2) o f the minerals
and the third-party grantee owns the other one-half (1/2) o f the minerals.
Smith v. Nyreen. 81 N.W.2d 769 (N.D. 1957).

Accord: Burbridge v. Rosen. 402 S.W.2d 502 (Ark. 1966) held that a
claimant who paid taxes for 7 years to wild and unenclosed lands pursuant
to Ark. Code Ann. § 18-11-102 not only acquires title to the surface and
non-severed mineral interests but also validates mineral reservations and
conveyances that appear in his chain-of-title and occurred during the
limitation period.
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The Court in Burbridge cited Clements v. Texas Co., supra and stated: “It
is well settled that when a trespasser in actual adverse possession o f
property either conveys the land with a reservation o f a mineral interest or
conveys a mineral interest itself, the continued possession by the surface
claimant inures to the benefit o f the mineral interest as well.” Id. at 504.

III.

Adverse Possession of Severed Mineral Interests by Working the Minerals.
A.

“When a mineral ownership has been severed by deed from the surface ownership,
as here, one cannot acquire title to the minerals by adverse possession unless he
actually invades the minerals by opening mines or drilling wells and continues that
action for the necessary statutory period.” Peterson v. Simpson. 690 S.W.2d 720
(Ark. 1985).

B.

The requisite production.
1.

Fitful and desultory mining operations.
Casual mining every 3 or 4 months from surface outcrops during the
limitation period amounted to only “fitful and desultory” occupancy for
mining purposes, insufficient to adversely possess the severed mineral
estate. No mines were opened or mining machinery installed on the land.
There was not continuous mining occupancy o f any o f the land for the
limitation period. Clavbrooke v. Barnes, 22 S.W.2d 390 (Ark. 1929).
Compare Thweatt v. Halmes, 580 S.W.2d 685 (Ark. 1979), wherein a
severed coal interest was held to have been adversely possessed when
mining occurred throughout the limitation period “when there was a
market for the coal,” and, also, 15 shafts were sunk and coal for sale was
advertised on the land and in a newspaper. But see the dissent by Justice
Hickman.

2.

Mineral extraction must infringe upon the severed mineral owner’s rights
(or commercial production is required).
Taking gas from an off-tract abandoned well for use in connection with a
chicken house and a domestic dwelling for the limitation period does not
establish adverse possession o f a severed mineral interest. The gas was not
sold and such use was not inconsistent with the severed mineral owner’s
exploration and development right. Hassell v. Texaco. Inc., 372 P.2d 233
(Okla. 1962).
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C.

D.

Effect o f production from an off-tract unit well.
1.

Production from an off-tract well does not mature limitation title to a
mineral interest in a tract that has been committed by the adverse
possession claimant to a voluntarily pooled unit. Brizzolara v. Powell. 218
S.W.2d 728 (Ark. 1949). An off-tract well is not notice o f production to
the mineral owners o f other tracts located within the unit.

2.

Production from an off-tract unit well on a drilling unit created by the
Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission, pursuant to the agency’s determination
that the unit well would drain the unit lands, may mature limitation title to a
mineral interest to a tract in a unit that the adverse possession claimant
commits to the drilling o f the unit well. See, Brizzolara v. Powell. 218
S.W.2d at 728. Contra Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Tomlinson. 859 P.2d
1088 (Ok. 1993); Hunt Oil Co. v. M oore. 656 S.W.2d 634 (Tex Ct. App.
1983); Dye v. Miller & Viele. 587 P.2d 139 (Utah 1978).

The extent o f the geographic area or the substance acquired.
1.

Adverse possession o f oil or gas is limited to the oil or gas that is or will be
produced by the then existing wells.
a.

The limits to actual possession: the legacy o f the hard mineral
cases.
The adverse possessor only acquires rights to the coal loosened or
actually mined.
"The owner o f the mine does not lose his rights as against the
owner o f the surface by mere nonuser. His title can only be
defeated by acts which actually take the mineral out o f his
possession. In a very late case it is said that it is possible that
adverse possession might be shown if a certain mine or quarry
were surrounded on all sides with galleries and a defined area was
so opened out. But, under ordinary circumstances, it is difficult to
see how there can be adverse possession o f so much o f the mines or
minerals as lie untouched in their bed." Pinev Oil & Gas Co. v.
Scott. 79 S.W.2d 394, 400 (Ky. 1935). See also , Sanford v.
Alabama Power Co., 54 So.2d 562 (Ala. 1951). French v. Lansing.
132N.Y.S. 523 (N.Y. 1911).
For a criticism o f this narrow view, see 1 Eugene Kuntz supra at
§ 10.5.
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b.

The geographic extent o f the adverse possessor’s claim is not
determined by the doctrine o f constructive possession based on his
color o f title.
i.

Some courts hold that the adverse possessor does not
acquire title to the produced mineral coextensive with the
legal description contained in his color o f title instrument.
See Pinev Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott. 79 S.W.2d 394, 400 (Ky.
1935), wherein the Court observed: “A disseisor upon the
surface may actually build upon, occupy, and use but a
portion o f the territory embraced within his marked line or
color, but he has an immediately potential use and
occupancy o f the remainder o f his claim, and the law by
construction extends his actual occupation over it, but,
when he gets below the surface and attempts to take
possession o f minerals, he can have no immediately
potential use or occupation o f the whole o f the minerals
over which the law can by construction extend his actual
possession; therefore he can have no possession o f the
unmined portion.” Id. at 400.

ii.

The better view.
Production for the limitations period from two wells in the
comer o f a 56 acre tract, under color o f title, matured title
to the oil interests, at least as to that production horizon, in
the entire tract. Diederich v. W are, 286 S.W.2d 643 (Ky.
App. 1956). The Court noted that the “subterranean
structure” underlying the tract was changed as the fugacious
minerals were produced by the wells. Thus, the adverse
possession claimants exercised dominion over all o f the oil
in the producing formation underlying the tract. Accord
Kinder v. La Salle County Carbon Coal Co., 141 N.E. 537
(Ill. 1923).

iii.

The Arkansas case.
Production o f oil from one tract within a lease does not
constitute “constructive production” o f all o f the oil
throughout the entire leasehold. Laney v. Monsanto
Chemical Co., 348 S.W.2d 826 (Ark. 1961). Diederich is
expressly disavowed. Id. at 827.
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Laney holds that a claimant paying taxes for 7 years under
color o f title pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 18-11-102,
acquires title to a non-severed mineral interest even though
the tract was subject to an oil and gas lease held by
production from an off-tract lease well. Laney is premised
on the rationale that the claimant, pursuant to the statute,
has constructive possession o f the tract even though the
non-severed mineral interest is subject to a producing oil
and gas lease.
2.

Adverse possession by production o f one substance does not mature
limitation title to other substances claimed under color o f title.
a.

The Arkansas case.
Production o f gas for the limitation period under color o f title, a
void mineral tax deed, did not acquire title by adverse possession to
the coal. Hurst v. Rice. 643 S.W.2d 563 (Ark. 1982).

b.

The better view.
Adverse possession by actually working one o f the minerals
matures limitation title to other mineral substances coextensive with
the scope o f the claim o f the color o f title. 1 Eugene Kuntz supra
at § 10.5.

E.

Other significant adverse possession cases involving actual mining o f severed
mineral interests.
1.

Production for the limitations period may allow acquisition by adverse
possession o f the title to an oil and gas leasehold estate when the oil and
gas lease has subsequently terminated. St. Louis Royalty Co. v.
Continental Oil Co., 193 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1952).

2.

A claimant to a working interest in the leasehold estate can acquire title by
adverse possession, as against other claimants as to the working interest,
through receipt for the limitation period o f revenues attributable to the
working interest and payment o f operating costs. Sun Operating Limited
Partnership v. Oatman, 9 11 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App. 1995).

3.

Receipt o f excess royalty payments throughout the limitation period does
not mature limitation title to the excess royalty interest. Palmer v. Lide.
567 S.W.2d 295 (Ark. 1978); Warmack v. Henry H. Cross Co., 377
S.W.2d 47 (Ark. 1964).
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